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Introduction
On 2 March 2016, the final report of the Australian
Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC) “Freedoms Inquiry”
Traditional Rights and Freedoms — Encroachments by
Commonwealth Laws1 (Report) was launched at Parlia-
ment House, Canberra by the Commonwealth Attorney-
General the Hon George Brandis. Almost 2 years in the
making, this “doomsday book”2 comprises a “vast body
of work”3 that is “singularly different and distinctive
from other ALRC inquiries”.4 The President of the
ALRC remarked that this “extraordinarily challenging”
inquiry involved identifying Commonwealth laws that
encroach upon 19 “traditional rights and freedoms” as
specified in the extensive terms of reference. “The
canvas was a wide one”5 and the 20 chapters of this
Report do indeed cover exceptionally broad terrain
“unprecedented in scale and importance”.6 Part-time
Commissioner Suri Ratnapala distinguished the focus of
this Report from all other law reform inquiries in that the
“Freedoms Inquiry” is concerned with the “general
health of our law measured against the timeless norms
and values that have been winnowed by our history and
legal tradition”.7
The “traditional rights and freedoms” examined in
the Report include:
• the freedoms of speech, religion, association, assem-
bly and movement;
• the rights and privileges concerning a fair trial, the
burden of proof, strict and absolute liability, self-
incrimination, legal professional privilege, retro-
spective laws, procedural fairness, judicial review,
immunity from civil liability;
• the delegation of legislative power; and
• property rights generally, personal and real.
This article provides an overview of one particular
area of its attention — property rights and the extent to
which Commonwealth laws regulating land and water
use interfere with them, if at all, legitimately or other-
wise.
The premise of the Report
The premise of the terms of reference with regard to
its treatment of property is that the private/public dichotomy
is actual, desirable and imbalanced. It is a dichotomy
that is fundamental to the taxonomy of law itself, if not
necessarily to its practice. The private/public dichotomy
provides the intellectual architecture8 of Anglo-
Australian law and distinguishes it from Indigenous
Australian laws which are structured differently accord-
ing to concepts of connectivity and responsibility rather
than separation and entitlement.9 It is important to also
note that although the Report describes law in the
language of “tradition” and “heritage”, it refers not to
those forged here in Australia by its First Peoples over
tens of thousands of years, but to a tradition forged
overseas and a heritage particular to European geogra-
phies and histories dating back less than a millennium.10
Reference is made on its first page to the Magna Carta
and parliamentary sovereignty:
The rights, freedoms and privileges set out in the Terms of
Reference have a long and distinguished heritage. Many
have been recognised in Australia, England and other
common law countries for centuries.11
Like many law textbooks, the Report uses history
instrumentally to lend authority to the approach taken by
the ALRC to its behemoth Report.
The premise of the terms of reference is articulated
by the framing of a question of whether there are laws
(modern, public, statutory) that “encroach” and/or “inter-
fere” with other laws (old, private, common). In fulfill-
ing its obligations under the reference, the ALRC
reproduces the public/private dichotomy in the structure
and language of the Report. But it also presents evidence
and poses questions that subtly challenge the currency
and viability of this dichotomy. True to its name and
function, the ALRC has published a Report that is
demonstrably committed to genuine reform by situating
a difficult inquiry within the tensions of the existing
legal framework while simultaneously nodding to law’s
vital and proven capacity for change and adaptation.
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Protecting rights and freedoms
With regard to the protection of real property rights,
the chapter reminds readers in Ch 2 that:
• the Australian Constitution provides for “just terms”
compensation to proprietors whose property rights
are compulsorily acquired by the Common-
wealth;12
• the principle of legality is underpinned by a faith
that parliament would use clear and plain language
if and when it intended to diminish or suspend
common law “fundamental” rights;13
• international law provides a significant influence
(if not necessarily binding legal obligations) on
the esteem with which rights and freedoms are
held in Australian law;14 and
• common law rights are by their nature residual in
that one’s right exists to the extent that it does not
impose on another’s right, and that therefore the
relativity of rights precludes a legal culture of
absolutism.15
Chapter 2 also captures the signature feature of the
Report in its consistent and explicit engagement with the
question of when and how limits on rights may be
justified, largely through an application of the concept or
“test” of proportionality:
… a structured proportionality analysis involves consider-
ing whether a given law that limits important rights has a
legitimate objective and is suitable and necessary to meet
that objective, and whether — on balance — the public
interest pursued by the law outweighs the harm done to the
individual right.16
Although the concept of proportionality, in regard to
property rights, implicitly repeats and accepts the public/
private dichotomy and is thus limited in terms of
potential reform in the “big picture” sense, it is helpful
as an accessible vocabulary through which reforms
could be advanced incrementally. Well-established in
constitutional jurisprudence, the ALRC endorses the use
of “proportionality”, elevating it to a viable methodol-
ogy in evaluating the “balance” between public/private
interests, referring to it in quasi-scientific terms as a
mode of analysis and a “serviceable” tool that has been
used “around the world for decades”.17
The Report also refers to the use of the concept of
proportionality in the domestic context of the scrutiny
processes and review mechanisms instituted in Austra-
lian law including various parliamentary committees,
statutory commissions and legislative drafting, consul-
tation and review. Notwithstanding its preference for
proportionality as a guiding concept or “test” in its
approach to a very large and fundamental question about
the legal organisation and distribution of responsibilities
and entitlements, the ALRC acknowledged substantial
concerns and critiques of the concept. Legal scholarship
is used in the Report to present these concerns critically,
in terms of the gap between the appearance of propor-
tionality as a test or “algorithm” and its practical
requirement to apply subjective, moral judgment to
questions without fact-based and “forensically ascertain-
able” answers.
The chapter acknowledges that it is not necessary to
find “a perfect method — if such a method exists — for
testing the justification of laws that limit rights”.18 The
entire topic of the Report may be “a question about
which reasonable people acting in good faith dis-
agree”.19 Accordingly, the ALRC concludes that although
a “rigid insistence on a prescribed proportionality frame-
work may … discourage more thorough and wide
ranging analysis”,20 the proportionality approach is
nonetheless “valuable” because it presupposes that the
regulatory interference with rights should only occur
when “truly necessary”.21 In setting out these method-
ological preferences early on, the ALRC indicates that
its approach to the Report is consistent with the premise
of the terms of reference — that the private/public
dichotomy exists, is legitimate and ought to be balanced
or rather, the hierarchy restored.22
Property rights — in theory
The final three chapters of the Report deal with
property rights. Chapter 18 considers property rights in
terms of their versatility, relativity and protection from
statutory encroachment. Chapter 19 deals with personal
property rights and is not dealt with in this article.
Chapter 20 considers real property rights and is dis-
cussed below.
Chapter 18 opens with references to 17th and 18th
century scholars who transformed the way property was
conceived from land as status, to land as capital.
Bentham, Blackstone and Locke are used to provide
historical legitimacy to the premise of modern liberal
thought — that private property and law are necessarily
and mutually constituted. The chapter swiftly moves on
to outline key developments in mainstream property
discourse including the notions of a bundle of rights,
copyright and native title. With regard to the ongoing
development of real property, the chapter quotes Peter
Butt as noting “categories of interests in land are not
closed” as they “change and develop as society changes
and develops”.23 Here, the Report provides a critical but
easily forgotten insight into proprietary interests in land
— they are versatile. The versatility of property interests
is particularly important in the consideration of the
compatibility and connectivity of property interests in
land with environmental responsibilities.
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Chapter 18 also considers the relativity of property
rights, reminding us that the operation of property rights
in Australian law involves an acceptance of the notion of
“priorities”. The rules of priorities determine which
rights prevail over other rights. “Each circumstance may
involve a ‘loser’ in the sense of someone losing out in a
contest of proprietary rights.”24 The point is made that
property rights are never absolute — rather they are
subject to the rights of others and to established rules of
priorities. Property rights are lost in other ways too. This
chapter outlines occasions when property rights are
forfeited completely according to adverse possession25
— when they are diminished by the interests in water,
minerals below and airspace above the land being
legally separated from the ownership of the land.26
Chapter 18 sets out the existing protections of private
property rights from public regulation through “statutory
encroachment” — an expression that suggests the prior-
ity of private law and the possibility of the impropriety
of public law. In this way, the language and structure of
the Report reproduce not only the private/public dichotomy
but also the established political hierarchy that it under-
pins.
Beginning with the encroachment of property rights
that is protected outright in Australian public law, the
acquisition of property by the Commonwealth,27 the
chapter then draws attention to the political origins of
this protection of private property rights by contrasting
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
which was designed as a limit on state power, to
s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution which was
designed as a grant of state power.28
The most important contribution of the chapter is its
attention to the question of whether Australia should
broaden its definition of interference (to non-acquisitive
interference). The Report refers to the American juris-
prudence of “takings” which sets a lower threshold to
activate constitutional protections of private property
rights. Quoting the part-time Commissioner overseeing
the Report, Emeritus Professor Suri Ratnapala, the
Report presents the view that private property rights are
“encroached” if not formally “acquired” by Regulations
concerning land zoning, for example, without compen-
sation despite “diminish[ing] the exchange value of
property”.29
Chapter 18 also introduces the question of whether
property rights are human rights, principally in a section
dealing with international law.30 A question is raised
whether such “rights” are equally adversely diminished
by expropriatory and “merely regulatory” public law.31
A further question is raised as to whether there is a
distinction to be made between human rights of a
universal application and rights of non-universal appli-
cation to the smaller social category of private propri-
etors.
The chapter concludes with an analysis of the “jus-
tifications for interferences”. It states the common law
presumption that:
… the power of parliament to encroach upon property
rights was subject to the qualification that any deprivation
was not arbitrary and only occurred where reasonable
compensation was given. … [and when] the action was
necessary and in the public interest.32
Importantly, the ALRC assures us that the authority
of parliament to enact laws “is not in issue”.33 The
question is not the legitimacy of public law but the
legitimacy of its objectives where they arguably “inter-
fere with, or affect, property rights” and whether the
public interest “outweighs the harm done to the indi-
vidual right”.34
The application of the proportionality test to the
relationship between private property and public interest
thus begins in a subsection entitled “Legitimate objec-
tives”. The legitimacy of the objectives of public laws
that affect real property rights involve “distinguishing
‘regulation’ or ‘control’ from ‘acquisition’, ‘deprivation’
or ‘taking’ [and are] generally intertwined with the
question of compensation”.35 The enormity of the chal-
lenge is neatly framed by Kevin Gray: “The precise
location of the threshold where regulation shades into
confiscation is one of the most difficult questions in
modern law.”36 It is to this most difficult question that
the ALRC turns its attention in the final chapter of its
magnum opus.
Property rights — in land
Chapter 20 is the second longest chapter37 of the
Report and, together with Ch 18, constitutes the largest
item of attention in the Report. The chapter is structured
into three sections:
• protections from statutory encroachments;
• justifications for limits on real property rights; and
• laws that interfere with real property rights (envi-
ronmental laws is listed as the first of three laws in
the category).
At the outset of the chapter, some clarifications are
made. First, that “interference” and “encroachment” are
almost synonymous with the “reduc[ed] … commercial
uses to which [the] property can be [prospectively]
applied”.38 Second, although the Report does not deal
with the laws of Australian states and territories, these
laws are responsible for the vast majority interferences
with property rights. However, the Report observes that
from landholders’ perspectives, the architecture of fed-
eralism does not remove the practical responsibility of
the Commonwealth for such interferences, given the
increasingly complex relationships between state and
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federal laws, policies and funding arrangements.39 It is a
point the chapter returns to when representing the
perspectives and submissions of rural and regional
landholders. Third, the “EPBC Act interferes with the
right to use land — but only to a limited extent”.40 The
chapter explains that the operation of the Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)
(EPBC Act) is limited to:
• proposed changes to land use, rather than current
land use practices; and
• land use likely to have a “significant” impact on “a
matter of national environmental significance”.41
The chapter also corrects any misunderstanding about
the frequency of EPBC Act restrictions of land use
practices, noting that “very few proposals have been
refused”.42 Quoting the Commonwealth Department of
the Environment figures that since the commencement
of the EPBC Act in 2000, 799 proposed actions “have
been approved and only 11 have been refused”.43 It also
cites a relevant stakeholder perspective on this point,
from the Australian Network of Environmental Defend-
ers Offices that:
… it is difficult to argue that the requirement to obtain a
permit for an action that is likely to have a significant
impact on a matter protected under international law
constitutes an undue burden on private property holders.44
The second section of Ch 20 “Justifications for limits
on real property rights” presents an analysis of the topic
using the “test” of proportionality. It groups together
various stakeholders into “those who emphasised an
environmental perspective and those who emphasised a
private property perspective”.45 Given the size and
resources of the relevant key organisations, the perspec-
tive of farmers might well be conflated with that of the
peak industry lobby group for primary producers, the
National Farmers’ Federation (NFF). For the purposes of
writing a report of the magnitude of the Freedoms
Inquiry, it makes sense to group stakeholders together
this way, but it is worth noting that perspectives on this
question are perhaps more complex than the binary
structure might first indicate.46
This section works through several justifications for
limits on real property rights:
• international obligations;47
• public interest in health and environmental protec-
tion;48
• adequacy of existing protections of private prop-
erty rights;49
• economic arguments (pertaining to compensation
and the polluter-pays/beneficiary-pays debate);50
• that property rights are a different order of rights
from human rights;51 and finally
• proportionality.52
The framing of the section using the language of
“limits on real property rights” rather than “interferences
with property rights” works effectively and consistently
with the legal analysis of property rights generally in
Ch 18. In that chapter, readers were reminded that
property rights are not absolute between themselves and
against non-proprietary interests. Preferring “limits” to
“interferences” thus reflects more accurately the legal
analysis and moves the debate into a broader perspective
about interests in land.
The final section of Ch 20 conducts an analysis of a
range of Commonwealth laws that “may be characterised
as interfering with vested property rights”53 without
deciding whether these are justified. The chapter dis-
cusses environmental laws, native title laws and criminal
laws. Having nominated 60 Commonwealth environment-
related statutes in force, the discussion of environmental
laws that interfere with real property rights is 20 pages
long and focuses on the EPBC Act and the Water
Act 2007 (Cth).
The chapter elaborates on an earlier point that the
EPBC Act is modest in the sense that it is concerned
with prospective rather than current land use practices.
“There are not even provisions in the legislation which
allow existing uses to be terminated on payment of
compensation, unless the land itself is compulsorily
purchased.”54 The Report noted that although unlikely,
if compensation were built in to the EPBC Act for
non-acquisitive limits imposed on prospective land use,
it could be creatively calculated (using rebates on
council rates, land tax, income tax and subsidies on
interest rates, herbicides and so on) or mitigated by
expansion of offset measures.55 However, the Report
cites Emeritus Professor David Farrier that there is no
legal right of development for any proprietor and that
the creation of one, in any form, would set new
(expensive) precedents (particularly in urban con-
texts).56 In his view, compensation “for lost expecta-
tions” is outdated and less effective than “payments for
active management by landowners to advance biodiversity
conservation objectives”.57
The ALRC does not conclude whether compensation
is desirable, but it does recommend that the next
scheduled review of the EPBC Act in 2019 “could
reassess whether interferences with property rights are
proportionate and could explore a range of compensa-
tory mechanisms”.58 It recommends that the “interrela-
tionship of Commonwealth and state laws” could be
considered in the same process.59 The Report is bal-
anced in its presentation of stakeholder perspectives —
it makes extensive use of various and conflicting sub-
missions and uses language both consistent with its
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reference, framing complex questions in terms of public/
private dichotomy, and that also challenges the status
quo,60 as a law reform commission should.
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